Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

1-1-2011

Seven-Sky v. Holder - Amicus Brief of SEIU and
Change to Win
Service Employees International Union

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
Service Employees International Union, "Seven-Sky v. Holder - Amicus Brief of SEIU and Change to Win" (2011). Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 232.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/232

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1316639

Filed: 07/05/2011

Page 1 of 48

No. 11-5047
ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED SEPTEMBER 23, 2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SUSAN SEVEN-SKY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF OF SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION
AND CHANGE TO WIN AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE
Patrick J. Szymanski
Change to Win
1900 L Street, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 721-6035
Attorney for Amicus
Curiae Change to Win

Judith A. Scott
Walter Kamiat
Mark Schneider
Ariel Zev Weisbard
Service Employees
International Union
1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 730-7455

Scott Kronland
Jonathan Weissglass
Jennifer Sung
P. Casey Pitts
Altshuler Berzon LLP
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108
Tel: (415) 421-7151
Fax: (415) 362-8064

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Service Employees
International Union

Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Service Employees
International Union and
Change to Win

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1316639

Filed: 07/05/2011

Page 2 of 48

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a), counsel for Amici Service Employees
International Union and Change to Win submits the following certificate as to
parties, rulings, and related cases:
A.

Parties, amici, and intervenors
To the best of my knowledge, all parties, intervenors, and amici before the

district court and in this court are listed in the Opening Brief of PlaintiffsAppellants; the Brief for Appellees; the Amicus Brief of Law Professors Barry
Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al.; and the Amicus Brief of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts; except for the following:
The amici included in the Amicus Brief of the National Women’s Law
Center et al.
The amici listed in the Notice of Intent To File Amicus Curiae Brief by
Economic Scholars
B.

Rulings Under Review
References to the rulings at issue appear in the Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-

Appellants.
C.

Related Cases
This case was never previously before this Court, or any other court, other

than the district court from which this case has been appealed. Amici Service
Employees International Union and Change to Win are not aware of any cases
i
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pending in this Court that involve the same parties or substantially the same issues,
or any such cases previously before this Court. References to other cases currently
pending in other federal courts that involve the same or similar issues as this
appeal are provided in the Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Dated: July 5, 2011
/s/ Scott Kronland
Scott Kronland

ii

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1316639

Filed: 07/05/2011

Page 4 of 48

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Amicus curiae Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) is an
international labor union with approximately 2.2 million members. Amicus curiae
Change to Win is a labor federation of four national and international labor unions
–the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, United Farm Workers of America,
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and SEIU –which
collectively represent 5.5 million working men and women throughout the United
States. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, SEIU and Change to
Win state that they are not affiliated with any publicly owned corporation, nor do
they have stock owned by a publicly owned company.

Dated: July 5, 2011
/s/ Scott Kronland
Scott Kronland

iii
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CERTIFICATE IN SUPPORT OF SEPARATE BRIEF
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 29(d), this separate brief is necessary because it
establishes that the PPACA’s minimum coverage provision is an income tax, and
as such, a constitutional exercise of Congress’taxing authority. This issue has not
been fully addressed by the parties, and, to the best of the undersigned counsel’s
knowledge, it will not be addressed by any other amici.

Dated: July 5, 2011
/s/ Scott Kronland
Scott Kronland

iv
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GLOSSARY
CBO

Congressional Budget Office

PPACA

Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act of 2010

SEIU

Service Employees International Union

xiii

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1316639

Filed: 07/05/2011

Page 15 of 48

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus curiae SEIU is the nation’s largest healthcare union, with more than
half its 2.2 million members in the healthcare field. SEIU supports the PPACA
because it helps ensure accessible, quality healthcare for all Americans, including
SEIU members and their families.
Amicus curiae Change to Win is a federation of four labor unions –the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, United Farm Workers of America, United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and SEIU –which
collectively represent 5.5 million working men and women. Change to Win is
committed to achieving affordable healthcare for all workers and their families.
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and no person other than amici and their
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
All applicable statutes, etc., are contained in Plaintiffs-Appellants’Brief and
Appellees’Brief.

1
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The minimum coverage provision of the PPACA, 26 U.S.C. §5000A, is a
proper exercise of Congress’“complete and all-embracing taxing power.”
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1916). The provision taxes the
income of individuals whose income exceeds the income tax filing thresholds,
while exempting those who purchase health insurance coverage. The tax
represents a small portion of any individual’s income; is measured as a percentage
of income (subject to a floor and ceiling); and is administered through the income
tax collection system. The tax generates substantial revenue that the federal
government can use to address the cost of providing healthcare for taxpayers
without adequate insurance, while creating an incentive for taxpayers to purchase
affordable coverage, reducing future costs to the government.
The Supreme Court already has upheld substantively indistinguishable
exercises of Congress’taxing power. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 581 (1937) (“Steward”), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937),
held that the similarly structured Social Security Act was an exercise of Congress’
taxing power and a rational response to the national problems caused by the
widespread lack of unemployment and old age insurance.
The court below ruled that the minimum coverage provision could not be
upheld as a tax because Congress invoked the Commerce Clause and used the label
2
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“penalty,”evincing an intent to regulate. This misconceives the proper analysis of
this issue.
First, whether an enactment is a valid exercise of the taxing power turns on
its substance, not on Congress’motives or choice of label. See, e.g., Hampton &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1866).
Because the minimum coverage provision operates to tax income and lacks any
“penalizing features”that are inconsistent with its characterization as a tax, Dep’t.
of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994), it is within
Congress’powers of taxation –no matter what label Congress chose or what
powers Congress believed validated it.
Second, regulatory and revenue-generating purposes are not mutually
exclusive; Congress validly exercises its taxing power even when its primary
purpose is regulatory. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
Finally, Congress’use of the label “penalty”is entirely consistent with an
intent to tax. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §1(f) (labeling certain income tax provisions
“marriage penalty”).
Plaintiffs argue that, for want of the word “tax,”one of the most significant
pieces of legislation in the last 50 years must be overturned entirely. This kind of
“magic words”jurisprudence is not the law. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504

3
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U.S. 298, 310 (1992). The courts are charged with policing (and protecting) the
substance of Congress’authority, not invalidating legislation based on mere
matters of form.
There is no serious argument that the PPACA’s minimum coverage
provision could not be accomplished through a differently labeled but
substantively indistinguishable exercise of the taxing power. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs cannot reasonably contend that it exceeds any fundamental limits on
Congress’authority. Rather, the PPACA’s opponents argue, in essence, that there
is insufficient evidence of congressional motive that the provision be understood as
an exercise of Congress’taxing authority. This is not only wrong on the facts; it is
simply not the way congressional authority is analyzed. Congress has ample
authority to assess a tax on the income of those who decline to purchase health
insurance. That is what the PPACA does. It should therefore be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Operates As An Income Tax That
Generates Revenue To Offset Healthcare Costs While Encouraging
Taxpayers To Purchase Coverage, Further Safeguarding The Treasury
The PPACA provision at issue here is part of a comprehensive reform

package designed to improve the nation’s health and reduce the federal deficit.
The provision requires “applicable individual[s]”to ensure that they and their

4
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dependents have “minimum essential coverage,”or pay an assessment. 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(a)-(b).
In enacting the PPACA, Congress specifically noted that healthcare costs,
including the costs of caring for the uninsured, significantly burden the federal
budget. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 1 (2010); id., pt. 2, at 983. The
minimum coverage provision addresses this fiscal burden by generating annual
revenue of more than $4 billion, CBO, “Payments of Penalties for Being
Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,”Apr. 30, 2010,
at 3; and by encouraging individuals with income to purchase health insurance for
themselves and their families. Covered individuals have the choice to either
purchase minimum essential coverage or pay a tax –promoting the PPACA’s
fiscal goals without requiring those who purchase coverage to pay twice.
1.

The courts must “presume that Congress acts consistent with its duty

to uphold the Constitution,”National Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702,
711 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and are “duty bound to construe a statute so as to sustain it, if
that is possible,”Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Thus, when the
constitutionality of a congressional act is questioned, “th[e] Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the

5
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question may be avoided.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (citation
omitted).
Ignoring these principles, Plaintiffs read the minimum coverage provision’s
sub-sections separately, arguing that §5000A(a), the so-called “individual
mandate,”is a “regulatory provision”that, standing alone, cannot be an exercise of
the taxing power. Plaintiffs then construe §5000A(b)(1) as a regulatory penalty
that “exists solely to further the individual mandate.” R21 at 32-33.
This exact approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The statute at issue there provided that the
States “shall be responsible for providing . . . for the disposal of . . . radioactive
waste,”id. at 169-70 (citation omitted), and was challenged as an impermissible
“direct command”on the States. The Court rejected the challenge, holding that the
“mandate”could not be analyzed on its own but instead had to be read together
with subsequent sections creating “incentives”for compliance. So read, the
“mandate”afforded the States “choices,”rather than imposing an impermissible
“command”upon the States. Id.
The minimum coverage provision is no different. Its “mandate”must be
analyzed together with the tax-based mechanism through which Congress
encouraged minimum coverage. Properly viewed as a whole, the minimum

6
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coverage provision is a valid taxing measure that affords individuals the choice of
either meeting a prescribed condition or paying a modest tax. See Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388 (“TMLC”), at *48 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011)
(Sutton, J., concurring) (explaining that the PPACA “does not compel individuals
to buy insurance”).
2.

As Plaintiffs acknowledge, R21 at 31, a monetary exaction’s

constitutionality is determined by its “practical impact, not [its] name tag.”
Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 439-42 (1999) (ordinance “declar[ing] it
‘unlawful . . . to engage in’a covered occupation . . . without paying [a] license
fee”established “income tax”); see also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
301 U.S. 495, 508 (1937); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 27
(1910); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71. Courts must look past “the formal
language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect.” Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 275-79 (1977).
In its practical operation, the minimum coverage provision is an income tax.
First, payment of the tax is conditioned upon receipt of income. See Acker,
527 U.S. at 437-39 (exaction is income tax for purposes of Buck Act if “‘levied on,
with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts’”)
(citing 4 U.S.C. §110(c)). Only individuals who receive income in excess of the

7
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filing threshold are subject to the tax. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(2). Plaintiffs’
assertion that the tax “applies to all individuals simply because they exist,”R21 at
35, is simply wrong.
Second, the amount paid is always a small fraction of a taxpayer’s annual
income.1 Thus, no sources of wealth other than income are taxed. Indeed, many
individuals with moderate incomes will be exempted from the tax. See, e.g., 26
U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1) (affordability exemption).
Third, the tax is “measured”as a percentage of income, subject to a floor
and ceiling (with both always far below total income), and remains an income tax
notwithstanding its ceiling and floor. The Social Security tax is similarly capped,
see 26 U.S.C. §3121(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. §430; and the “alternative minimum tax,”26
U.S.C. §55, similarly ensures that taxpayers pay a minimum amount of federal
income tax overall.2

1

In 2016, for example, the payment by a taxpayer without coverage cannot be
greater than (1) 2.5% of household income above the filing threshold, or (2) a flat
dollar amount ranging from $695 to $2085, depending on family size. 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(c)(2)-(3). The tax will always be a small portion of total income under
either method.
2
The payment will be calculated as a percentage of income for individuals with a
broad range of incomes, e.g., from less than $40,000 to more than $200,000 in
2016 (for single individuals). This range includes, on the low end, the income at
which 2.5% of household income over the filing threshold exceeds the flat
(continued)

8
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Fourth, the tax is collected entirely through the income tax system and its
self-reporting mechanisms. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b)(2). Payments must be “assessed
and collected in the same manner as taxes,”and are included by law in “any
reference in [the Internal Revenue Code] to ‘tax.’” Id. §§5000A(g)(1), 6671(a).
The PPACA also treats family relationships in the same manner as the general
income tax code. Id. §5000A(b)(3) (individuals liable for payments required by
dependents or spouse); id. §5000A(c)(4) (household income and family size
defined by dependents reported on income tax return) (citing 26 U.S.C. §151).
These features further demonstrate that the minimum coverage provision operates
–and will be understood –as an income tax.3

(continued)

payment amount, and, on the high end, the income at which that same percentage
exceeds an estimated average premium of $5,000 for individual coverage. If the
average premium in 2016 is higher, the upper level will be greater. Because 2016
filing thresholds are not available, we use 2010 filing thresholds.
3
Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage provision cannot be an income tax
because income is not the sole factor that determines its applicability and amount.
R21 at 35 n.18. This has never been the legal test. But in any case, some of the
very factors that, in Plaintiffs’view, make the tax a non-income tax –such as “the
number of people within the taxpayer’s household”–also determine the amount of
a taxpayer’s general federal income tax. 26 U.S.C. §151. And, because income
taxes and other excise taxes are subject to the same constitutional requirements, the
minimum coverage provision is constitutional even if it is construed as a form of
excise tax other than an income tax.

9
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Plaintiffs wrongly contend that the minimum coverage provision

cannot be an exercise of the taxing power because Congress made Commerce
Clause findings but “d[id] not mention the tax power.” R21 at 29-30. There is no
requirement that Congress expressly invoke its taxing power and, unlike with the
Commerce Clause, the courts have never required congressional “findings”
regarding exercises of the taxing power. “[T]he constitutionality of action taken by
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise.” Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948). “[The
Court’s] duty in passing on the constitutionality of legislation is to determine
whether Congress had the authority to adopt legislation, not whether it correctly
guessed the source of that power.” Usery v. Charleston Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169,
1171 (4th Cir. 1977).
Further, while mere labels cannot determine whether Congress had the
constitutional capacity to pass the PPACA, the assertion here (relevant or not) that
Congress had no intent to tax is simply wrong. Congress in fact expressly enacted
the PPACA and the minimum coverage provision for revenue purposes. See, e.g.,
PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1563(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010) (“[T]his Act
will reduce the Federal deficit . . . .”); Letter from CBO to Chairman Baucus (Sept.
16, 2009) (estimating revenues generated by “penalty”); Joint Committee on
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Taxation, JCX-43-09 (Oct. 29, 2009) (estimating revenue effects of “revenue
provisions”including “Tax on Individual Without Acceptable Health Care
Coverage”). Congress may exercise its regulatory and taxation powers
simultaneously. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 428 (1940)
(finding import duty exercise of both taxing power and power to regulate foreign
commerce); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412; infra Section I.5.
Further, many in Congress recognized this as a tax. Proponents expressly
invoked Congress’taxing power. See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S13581 (Dec. 20,
2009) (Sen. Baucus); 155 Cong. Rec. S13751-52 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy);
156 Cong. Rec. H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); 156 Cong. Rec. H1826
(Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter). Others described the measure as a tax. See, e.g.,
H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 265 (2010) (discussing “tax on individuals who
opt not to purchase health insurance”); 156 Cong. Rec. E506 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep.
Waxman) (“The individual responsibility requirement requires individuals to pay a
tax on their individual tax filings . . . .”); 155 Cong. Rec. S10877 (Oct. 29, 2009)
(Sen. Hatch) (“Some may say this is simply a penalty for not doing what Uncle
Sam wants you to do, but let us face it, it is nothing more than a new tax.”). And,
the label “penalty”is consistent with Congress’intent to tax: Throughout the
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legislative record, Congress used terms like “tax,”“assessable payment,”
“assessable penalty,”“tax penalty,”and “penalty”interchangeably.4
4.

The court below correctly acknowledged that it “must first consider

whether §5000A(b), which uses the term ‘penalty,’operates as a tax.” R39 at 56.
Nonetheless, instead of examining its operation, the court focused exclusively on
its label, and insisted that the provision’s “penalty”label precluded a finding that
the assessment is a tax. R39 at 56-59; see also TMLC at *29-*30. Yet years of
precedent teach that a monetary exaction’s constitutionality is determined by its
“practical effect,”rather than by its name tag, and that “magic words or labels”
cannot “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (citation

4

See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 55-56 (citing materials); 156 Cong. Rec. H1917
(Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Kirk) (“Among the new taxes is a new ‘Individual Mandate
Tax. . . .’”); 155 Cong. Rec. S12768 (Dec. 9, 2009) (Sen. Grassley) (“The . . .
individual mandate penalty . . . . can be called a penalty, but it is a tax.”); 155
Cong. Rec. S11454 (Nov.18, 2009) (Sen. McCain) (“Taxes on individuals who fail
to maintain government-approved health insurance coverage will pay $4 billion in
new penalties . . . .”); 155 Cong. Rec. H12576 (Nov. 6, 2009) (Rep. Franks) (“It
would impose a 2.5 percent penalty tax on those who do not acquire healthcare
insurance.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S11143 (Nov. 5, 2009) (Sen. Johanns) (discussing
“penalty tax on individuals without insurance”); 155 Cong. Rec. S10746 (Oct. 27,
2009) (Sen. Enzi) (“Most young people will probably do the math and decide . . . I
can pay the $750-a year tax penalty rather than pay $5,000 a year more for health
insurance.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S8644 (Aug. 3, 2009) (Sen. Kyl) (“There would be a
penalty if they refused to [buy health insurance] that would go directly to their
income tax.”).
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omitted); Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 (rejecting “rule[s] of draftsmanship”that
“distract the courts and parties from their inquiry into whether the challenged
[provision] produced [unconstitutional] results”); Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. C.I.R.,
277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960) (“It is not necessary to uphold the validity of [a] tax
imposed by the United States that the tax itself bear an accurate label”); In re
Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Leckie”) (Congress
exercised taxing power in requiring mine operators to pay insurance “premiums”).
Indeed, under unquestioned Supreme Court precedents dating back well over
a century, a monetary exaction may be an exercise of the taxing power even if
Congress gives it a label that is unambiguously regulatory. In 1866, the License
Tax Cases recognized that a fee imposed on gambling and liquor businesses was a
constitutional exercise of Congress’taxing power even though Congress labeled
the fee a “license,”72 U.S. at 471; it worded the “license”requirement as a
prohibition on unlicensed activity, id. at 468-69; legislatures generally use
“licenses”to regulate, id. at 470-71; and the “license”requirement discouraged
businesses widely considered to be immoral, id. at 473. See also Acker, 527 U.S.
at 439-42.
Of course, “penalty”is far more consistent with the characterization of an
assessment as a tax than “license.” Congress explicitly required that this “penalty”
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be construed as a tax for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C.
§§5000A(g)(1), 6671(a); and has long used the term “penalty”when referring to
taxes. E.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107–16, §§301-303; 26 U.S.C. §1(f) (repeatedly referring to the income-tax
differential paid by certain married couples as the “marriage penalty”). Indeed, the
use of “penalty”to describe a “tax”is common among courts, lawyers, and
economists.5
Moreover, as noted above, at all stages of the PPACA’s consideration,
legislators referred to the minimum coverage provision as a “tax”and used the
terms “tax”and “penalty”interchangeably.6 To strike down major legislation
because Congress used the word “penalty”rather than “tax”would ignore the
statute’s actual operation, the understandings of many in Congress, the relevant

5

E.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 327 (2005) (describing tax on early
withdrawals from IRA accounts as “tax penalty”); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S.
268, 275 (1978) (funds labeled “penalty”by Congress retained “essential character
as taxes”); Hemingway v. United States, 81 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1164 (D. Utah 1999)
(describing tax on “golden parachute payments”as “tax penalty”); Dan Dhaliwal,
Oliver Zhen Li, Robert Trezevant, Is a Dividend Tax Penalty Incorporated into the
Return on a Firm’s Common Stock?, 35 Journal of Accounting and Economics 155
(2003).
6
Supra Section I.3.
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precedent on the tax authority, and the Court’s duty to uphold statutes that are, in
substance, entirely constitutional.
5.

It is similarly irrelevant whether Congress was in some sense

“motivated”by regulatory goals. Sozinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14. Congress may
exercise its taxing power for regulatory purposes, including to deter or promote
particular activities. Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“It is beyond serious question that a
tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed.”); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 782 (discussing
“mixed-motive taxes that governments impose both to deter a disfavored activity
and to raise money”); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412 (“[O]ther motives in the selection
of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional action.”).
Indeed, a revenue raising measure can be a valid exercise of the taxing
power even if Congress’primary purpose is regulatory. See, e.g., Sanchez, 340
U.S. at 44 (“[T]he revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.”). Hampton, for
example, held that a protectionist tariff expressly enacted “to regulate the foreign
commerce”was a valid exercise of Congress’taxing power. 276 U.S. at 401. The
Court noted that the first Congress imposed tariffs for protectionist purposes, and
emphatically rejected the argument “that it is unconstitutional to frame [monetary
exactions] with any other view than that of revenue raising.” Id. at 411-12. The
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text and history here demonstrate that the minimum coverage provision was
intended to, and will in fact, generate significant revenue. See supra Section I.3.
That is enough.
Moreover, the revenue and regulatory purposes here are interrelated:
Congress’goal of lessening the Treasury’s healthcare burden is served whether
individuals choose to pay the tax or purchase essential coverage. As the Supreme
Court recognized in upholding a similarly structured tax system, an exaction does
not lose its character as a tax simply because it can be avoided through an act that
Congress wishes to encourage and that will itself reduce the nation’s fiscal burden.
Steward, 301 U.S. at 590-592.
6.

Not all monetary exactions are taxes. But as numerous cases –

including Steward, Sanchez, and Hampton –demonstrate, the Supreme Court has
“abandoned”the Lochner-era “distinction[] between regulatory and revenueraising taxes.” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974). Instead,
exactions with regulatory purposes or effects that lack uniquely “penalizing
features”remain taxes enacted pursuant to Congress’taxing authority. Kurth
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Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.7 As Justice Holmes recognized, there is no “difference
between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing”in the
absence of “some further disadvantages.” Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.
L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897). Many taxes discourage (or induce) behavior that is
subject to (or exempt from) the tax, but far more is needed to conclude that such a
provision is not a tax. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (wagering
tax not penalty “regardless of its regulatory effect”); Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some measure regulatory.”).
Of course “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features”of
an exaction “when it loses its character”as a tax. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.
That is not the case here.
First, the minimum coverage provision gives taxpayers the option of
purchasing insurance or paying the tax. Had Congress intended to ensure
compliance with a regulatory “mandate,”it could have structured the “penalty”so

7

The Sixth Circuit cited Kurth Ranch in claiming that the distinction “retains force
today.” TMLC at *33-*34. To the contrary, Kurth Ranch cautioned “against
invalidating”a monetary exaction because “oppressive or because the legislature’s
motive was somehow suspect,”for both taxes and penalties “deter certain
behavior.” Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778-79 (emphasis added). Kurth Ranch
simply recognized that “the extension of the penalizing features”of a monetary
exaction may eventually cause it to “lose[] its character”as a tax. Id. at 779. The
minimum coverage provision does not operate in this manner. Infra Section I.6.
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that payment would not relieve individuals of the underlying obligation. Cf.
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, 518 U.S. 213, 225-226
(1996).
Second, the amount of the tax is at most the approximate equivalent of the
cost of insurance, not an excessively “high rate”“consistent with a punitive
character.” Cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780 (punitive drug tax was eight times
drug’s market value). Congress’non-punitive approach is evident in the modest
overall amount of the tax, which is pro-rated if the taxpayer obtains insurance for
part of the tax year. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b); cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922), entitled “The Child Labor Tax Case”(improper “penalty”
not pro-rated).
Third, payment of the tax is not conditioned on illegal conduct. Cf. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781-82 (conditioning tax on crime “is ‘significant of penal and
prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue’”) (quoting United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)). Indeed, one faces no consequence other
than the tax for opting not to purchase insurance; the PPACA specifically bars the
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government from resorting to criminal prosecution, penalties, liens, or levies for
failure to pay the tax. Id. §5000A(g)(2).8
Finally, the minimum coverage provision is located in the Internal Revenue
Code, collected through the tax system, and enforced by the tax authorities,
evidencing an exercise of the taxing power. See Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583 n.12; cf.
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 35 (noting that improper “penalty”was
enforced by Secretary of Labor).
Because the minimum coverage provision operates as an income tax and has
no “penalizing features,”it is an income tax for constitutional purposes.
II.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Within Congress’Plenary Power
To Tax Income
As an income tax, the minimum coverage provision is well within Congress’

taxing power. The Constitution affords Congress broad and comprehensive power
to tax, independent of the other enumerated congressional powers, and subject only
to narrow limitations. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936); Pacific

8

That Congress took pains to make enforcement less punitive than other taxes
demonstrates that, here, there has been no “extension of the penalizing features”
that might take the exaction outside of Congress’taxing authority. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. at 779. Nor does Congress’reliance on less intrusive collection measures
undermine the conclusion that this is a tax. See Acker, 527 U.S. at 440-41
(exaction was income tax where enforcement was limited to suit for collection).
The Sixth Circuit’s contrary reasoning, TMLC at *32, was error.
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Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 443-46 (1868); Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (“A general power is given to Congress,
to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only
on exports.”). Congress’power to tax income is especially broad. See, e.g., United
States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936) (“When it is
[income], it may be taxed . . . .”).
A.

The Constitution’s Taxation Provisions

“The great object of the Constitution was, to give Congress a power to lay
taxes, adequate to the exigencies of government. . . .” Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173.
“[N]othing is clearer, from the discussions in the Convention and the discussions
which preceded final ratification by the necessary number of States, than the
purpose to give this power to Congress, as to the taxation of everything except
exports, in its fullest extent.” Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540
(1869). This “complete and all-embracing taxing power”“is exhaustive and
embraces every conceivable power of taxation.” Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12-13.
The power is subject to meaningful but narrow limitations, none of which
apply here.
1.

An exercise of Congress’taxation power must produce “some

revenue.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514; United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94
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(1919) (requiring “relation to the raising of revenue”). The minimum coverage
provision easily satisfies this requirement. The PPACA was prompted in part by
Congress’concern about the fiscal strain of rising healthcare costs, and the
minimum coverage provision will generate $4 billion in revenue, far exceeding the
revenue generated by other valid taxes. Cf. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 n.4 (noting
valid taxes generating $3,501 and $28,911).
2.

Congress must use its taxation power to promote the “general

welfare.” U.S. Const., art. I, §8. The scope of the “general welfare”“is quite
expansive.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976). The discretion to determine
whether a tax serves the general welfare “belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
The minimum coverage tax is part of a programmatic response to the
significant national problems caused by the number of Americans without
adequate health insurance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2). This readily satisfies
the general welfare requirement.
3.

The Constitution imposes two additional limits on the means by which

Congress taxes: “direct taxes, including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned;
[and] duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform.” Soule, 74 U.S. at 446.
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Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage provision, if a tax, is a direct tax
requiring apportionment. This characterization is simply wrong. Supra Section
I.2. But in any case, in taxing income, Congress acts with the specific
authorization of the Sixteenth Amendment, which gives Congress “power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.” U.S. Const. amend. XVI (emphasis added). The Amendment
grants Congress plenary authority to tax any “accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.” C.I.R. v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Although Congress may not use
this power to pass taxes that plainly operate as property taxes requiring
apportionment, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920), the Supreme
Court has emphasized the narrowness of this holding, Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at
430-31, and recognized that “income”should be construed liberally, see
Merchants’Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 521 (1921).
Under the Sixteenth Amendment, income taxes need only be uniform.
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18-19. A tax satisfies this requirement if it exhibits no
“undue preference”for certain states. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 86
(1983). The minimum coverage tax readily satisfies this test because it applies the
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same formula throughout the nation. Although the affordability exemption is
defined by the cost of health insurance in the State where a taxpayer resides, see 26
U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii), such a distinction based on neutral factors and
exhibiting no intent to discriminate satisfies the uniformity requirement.
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 74-86 (tax exemption for “Alaskan oil”consistent with
uniformity requirement because reflected “climactic and geographic conditions”).
4.

Finally, an exercise of Congress’plenary taxation power must not

offend the Constitution’s individual rights provisions, by violating, for instance,
constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy or self-incrimination. See Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). There is no
reasonable argument that the minimum coverage provision offends any provision
of the Bill of Rights.9
B.

Plaintiffs Rely Upon Discredited Restrictions On The Taxing Power

Both Plaintiffs and the Sixth Circuit rely on discredited Lochner-era cases –
specifically, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); and Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936) –to contend that a tax’s regulatory purpose can take it outside the scope of

9

The provision also has no “penalizing features”that would preclude its
characterization as a tax. Supra Section I.6.
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Congress’taxing power. See R21 at 32-33 & n.17; TMLC at *33. This reliance is
both revealing and misplaced.
First, both cases involved exactions with numerous penalizing features,
absent here, that demonstrated their regulatory nature. This is the point for which
the two cases are occasionally cited. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 at 779; see also
supra Part I.6 (noting that exaction at issue in Child Labor Tax Case was quite
substantial, not pro-rated, and enforced by Labor Secretary); Steward, 301 U.S. at
590-93 (limiting Butler and Child Labor Tax Case to their facts).
Second, these cases cannot be reconciled with the many pre- and postLochner era precedents establishing that federal taxes may be enacted for
regulatory purposes, including to deter or encourage particular behaviors. See
supra Section I.5 (discussing Hampton, Sanchez, and License Tax Cases).
Plaintiffs nonetheless suggest that Child Labor Tax Case and Butler prohibit
Congress from using its taxing power to regulate that which (in Plaintiffs’view) it
cannot regulate directly. R21 at 32-33. But “[f]rom the beginning of our
government, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral
intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed
to their accomplishment.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45 (quotation omitted, emphasis
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added). Courts have long held that Congress may impose conditional taxes or
place conditions on the receipt of government funds to achieve “objectives not
thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields.” South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citation omitted) (collecting cases); see also
Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress cannot
prohibit lobbying but can tax contributions to organizations that lobby while
exempting contributions to those that do not). Put simply, the taxing power
“reaches every subject.” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71.10
The contrary decisions in both cases (and other similar cases of that era)
turned on the thoroughly discredited view that the Tenth Amendment bars
Congress from seeking to impact, directly or indirectly, areas of policy deemed
“matters of state concern”and thus “within power reserved to the States”–even
through otherwise valid exercises of its General Welfare Clause powers. Compare

10

Because Congress’taxing and spending power “is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution,”Butler, 297 U.S. at 66, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained taxes on intrastate activity, including in
contexts (or during periods) where such activities were understood as beyond
Congress’other enumerated powers. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340
(1945) (“death tax”); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929) (gift tax);
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (inheritance and legacy tax); Scholey v.
Rew, 90 U.S. 331 (1874) (estate tax); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71 (tax on
intrastate lottery and liquor trades).

25

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1316639

Filed: 07/05/2011

Page 40 of 48

Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36; with, e.g.,
Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 362 (“The Tenth Amendment does not operate as a
limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national
government.”). The Tenth Amendment simply does not prohibit Congress from
using its taxing and spending power to create financial incentives for conduct that
Congress has determined serves the general welfare. New York, 505 U.S. at 16667, 171-73.
C.

The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Constitutionally
Indistinguishable from the Social Security Act

In fact, the Supreme Court has directly rejected the claim that Child Labor
Tax Case and Butler prohibit Congress from exercising its taxing authority to
increase participation in insurance programs meeting minimum national standards.
From the perspective of Congress’taxation authority, the minimum coverage tax is
no different from the unemployment and old age insurance taxes Congress
established through the Social Security Act. See Helvering, 301 U.S. 619;
Steward, 301 U.S. 548. The constitutional propriety of that exercise of Congress’
taxation power is beyond dispute; there is no substantive basis to treat this income
tax any differently.
1.

The Social Security Act established comprehensive insurance

programs to address the financial insecurity stemming from economic
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retrenchment and “old age.” Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641. To fund the “Federal
Old-Age Benefits,”Congress “la[id] two different types of tax, an ‘income tax on
employees,’and ‘an excise tax on employers.’” Id. at 635-36. To promote the
development of unemployment insurance programs, Congress paired its tax on
employers with a credit for those who contributed to state insurance funds that
satisfied certain criteria. Steward, 301 U.S. at 574.
In Helvering and Steward, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional
challenges to these provisions. Helvering rejected claims that the tax on employers
“was not an excise as excises were understood when the Constitution was adopted”
and that the Act was “an invasion of powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment to
the states or to the people.” 301 U.S. at 638. Steward rejected the argument that
Congress’tax and credit system was a regulatory mandate on employers to make
particular insurance contributions and on states to create particular programs, such
that the “so-called tax was not a true one.” 301 U.S. at 592. Steward concluded
that the conditional tax credit was a reasonable way to structure a tax, as it
“promoted . . . relief through local units”while “in all fairness”ensuring that
employers making contributions that helped alleviate the problem would not “pay a
second time.” Id. at 589.
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Taxpayers have continued to resist payment of the taxes by complaining
(like opponents of the PPACA) that Congress cannot use its taxing power to
establish “compulsory benefits”that they do not want or will not use. Those
claims, however, have been universally rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982); Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 521, 525 (“It is irrelevant . . . that
some pay the tax who have not occasioned its expenditure, or that in the course of
the use of its proceeds . . . the legislature has benefited individuals, who may or
may not be related to those who are taxed.”).
2.

Instead of mandating participation in a single national insurance

program, or taxing everyone and then providing a credit to those with insurance,
the PPACA gives taxpayers the choice of purchasing adequate insurance or paying
a tax. This approach generates general revenue and provides an incentive for
taxpayers to purchase health insurance, while imposing no additional obligations
upon those who have purchased coverage.
This minor difference from the Social Security Act in form does not render
the PPACA’s conditional tax unconstitutional. Payment of the minimum coverage
tax is, as in Steward, “dependent upon the conduct of the taxpayers.” 301 U.S. at
591. Steward established that Congress may use its taxing power to stimulate
activity, including the purchase of insurance, where the failure to act contributes to
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a costly national problem. Id. Steward recognized that many states, to avoid
occupying “a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or
competitors,”would not independently enact unemployment compensation
programs. Id. at 588. The Social Security Act addressed this problem through a
tax that generated revenues “used and needed by the nation as long as states [were]
unwilling . . . to do what can be done at home,”while “crediting the taxpayer . . . to
the extent that his contributions [to a state program] . . . simplified or diminished
the problem of relief and the probable demand upon the resources of the fisc.” Id.
at 588-89.
The minimum coverage provision is indistinguishable, in substance and
effect, from the conditional tax in Steward. Providing healthcare to the uninsured
imposes an immense burden on the state and federal fiscs. E.g., H.R. Rep. No.
111-443, pt. 2, at 983 (2010) (“In 2008, total government spending to reimburse
uncompensated care costs . . . was approximately $42.9 billion.”). Most states
have not gone beyond providing care to the indigent, children, and elderly –
leaving many Americans with no health coverage. Meanwhile, employer-provided
health benefits are declining because of the rising costs of healthcare. High
Healthcare Costs: A State Perspective: Hearing Before S. Comm. On Finance,
110th Cong. S2 (2008) (Sarah Collins, The Commonwealth Fund). Many
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individuals who wish to purchase insurance cannot do so. 155 Cong. Rec. S1356869 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus). Now, as in 1935, Congress has “many reasons –
fiscal and economic as well as social and moral –for planning to mitigate disasters
that bring these burdens in their train.” Steward, 301 U.S. at 587.
The PPACA addresses the obstacles to comprehensive health insurance
coverage, in part by barring practices (such as denying coverage for pre-existing
conditions) that make affordable coverage unavailable to many, and in part by
providing tax incentives for individuals to purchase insurance. Here, no less than
with Social Security, “[t]he purpose of [Congress’] intervention . . . is to safeguard
its own treasury and as an incident to that protection to place the [taxpayers] upon
a footing of equal opportunity. Drains upon its own resources are to be checked;
obstructions to the freedom of the [taxpayers] are to be leveled.” Id. at 590-91. By
giving taxpayers the choice to purchase insurance or pay a tax that is at most the
“approximate equivalent[],”id. at 591, the minimum coverage provision is
designed, like the Social Security Act, to prevent taxpayers who have otherwise
paid for coverage from having “to pay a second time.” Id. at 589.
It is meaningless formalism to argue that Congress could have passed the
minimum coverage provision as an increased income tax on all taxpayers
accompanied by a credit for those with qualifying health insurance, but that it
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could not adopt the more direct course of a conditional tax imposing the same net
cost. See, e.g., TMLC at *29. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this
approach to a tax’s constitutionality. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288
(“[F]ormalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden
effect.”). Both methods afford the taxpayer the same choice with the same net tax
effect. See United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 517 (1942).
The Constitution gives Congress the “useful and necessary right . . . to select
. . . means”“which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the object
to be accomplished.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 419 (1819). Here, the
means Congress chose –directly imposing an income tax upon those who have not
purchased health insurance –is simpler and less administratively onerous than a
functionally identical tax and credit system, especially since the majority of
income earners already have health coverage. Nothing in the Constitution requires
Congress to refrain from using the most efficient means to accomplish its
permitted ends. See id. at 421 (Congress may use all “appropriate”and “plainly
adapted”means).
In substance and effect the minimum coverage provision is an income tax
well within Congress’enumerated powers. Matters of mere form cannot render
unconstitutional this proper exercise of the taxation power.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’case.
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